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Abstract
This paper will examine specific processes involved within the decision-making
process of how to allocate limited health care resources. I will start by discussing how in
order to compare and differentiate between health states, we have created ranking
systems, based on the health state’s impact on people’s quality of life, which health states
need more care, and which can be most effectively treated. We evaluate impact on quality
of life by assigning quality weights to years of life lived with that health state, which we
call quality-adjusted life years, or QALYs.
Next, I will discuss the problems with assigning quality weights to health states;
specifically, the disability paradox, meaning the distinct differences between quality
weights assigned by non-patients versus patients.
After that, I will explain how depression defies the trend of the disability paradox,
and causes our prior arguments about why patients and non-patients rate health states
different to contradict themselves., This leads me to suggest that we should consider a
different way of deciding between different quality weights. I examine the arguments for
choosing higher or lower quality weights, and conclude that because we have a moral
imperative to provide health care resources to those in need, particularly those who are
disadvantaged, we should take the lower quality weights and err on the side of
overspending on health states. Ultimately, this will create the greatest change in funding
for health states like depression that go against the disability paradox. Finally, I address
the economic trade-offs we have to consider if we make the decision to spend more on
treating health states.
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INTRODUCTION

Malaria, heart disease, cancer, depression – all of these diseases kill many people
each year. Ideally, we would have unlimited resources so we could fund research teams
to hunt for cures for these diseases, and give doctors leeway to administer any and all
available treatments to those suffering from these diseases and in need. But resources are
limited, and we can’t serve every need. Should one of these get priority over the others,
or does one merit less attention and funding? How do we determine where and how to
use our limited resources?
Consider the difficulty in this hypothetical choice; we have the money to cure one
group of people, and we must choose between curing 100 people of depression or 100
people of paraplegia.1 If our goal is to maximize social welfare, which one of these is
more valuable in serving that goal? We need a method of comparing the two, but they
lack factors in common, like symptoms or causes, that would allow us to place them on
the same scale and make a rational decision that goes beyond some loose intuition of
which is “worse.” Deciding how to allocate health care resources will involve making
decisions between treating and funding research into health states that have little to
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This is probably an unrealistically stark and straightforward scenario, but the real trade-offs would likely
be just as harsh and the choices just as difficult to make.
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nothing in common; we need a way of differentiating and drawing comparisons between
broken limbs and Parkinson’s and melanoma.
In order to find the most socially beneficial way of distributing health care
resources, we create methods of ranking health states according to their impact on
people's lives, we examine which health states need more care, and we evaluate which
can be most effectively treated. The primary way that we have chosen to do this is to
examine the impact of a health state on the quality of life one can experience. Quality of
life encapsulates many factors, which means it can lead to a scale on which we can
compare any two health states – any given health state will have some impact on quality
of life, even if it is arguably negligible, and thus we can place any health state somewhere
on the scale between death and perfect health.2
To measure how health states impact quality of life, we determine the quality
weight of a year in a given health state. The weights are on a scale of 0, meaning death, to
1, indicating perfect health. If a person’s quality weight with tuberculosis is equal to .669,
this would mean that each year of their life was equivalent to roughly 67% of a year of
life at full health (Salomon et al, 2010). Years described by quality weights are called
quality-adjusted life years, or QALYs.
We begin calculating quality weights and thus QALYs by giving surveys,
designed by experts, to the general public. These surveys elicit the preferences of the
population in regards to different health states and are then converted into quality
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The point at which a change in quality of life becomes negligible is not discussed in this paper, but the
larger point, that every health state other than perfect health will have some impact, is important to note in
order to show why quality of life is a good metric to use.
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weights, also called preference scores, for different health states. We use these quality
weights in cost-effectiveness analysis to compare the gain from treating or curing
different health states. For example, if someone has a QALY per year of .4, curing them
would incur a QALY gain of .6. On the other hand, a person with a different disease
might have a QALY of .2 and curing them would incur a QALY gain of .8. If costs were
equal we would put our limited health care resources into helping the person with more
potential for gain. Even in scenarios when costs are equal, we can calculate costeffectiveness ratios in order to compare and make choices.
This would all be very straightforward if we had a single, precise value for the
quality weight of each health state. However, this is not the case. Different groups (i.e.
different age brackets, genders, etc.) sometimes seem to provide different quality weights
for the same heath state. One of the most studied and most debated of these is the
differences in the average quality weights given by patients versus non-patients.
Patients who have a specific health state and non-patients who have never
experienced it tend to give very different numbers for the same health states. This leads to
many arguments for which group we should listen to when we use quality weights in
cost-effectiveness analysis, as the different numbers lead to different cost-effectiveness
ratios. Many authors have given different reasons for the variation between these groups
and what factors may lead one group to have an inaccurate understanding of their own
quality of life.
This becomes even more complicated when we consider the case of depression.
Normally, patients give higher quality weights to health states while non-patients give
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lower ones. This is called the Disability Paradox, and will be discussed at length in
chapter two, The Disability Paradox. But evaluations of depression show the opposite
trend, with patients valuing depression at a lower quality weight than non-patients. The
implications of this might lead us to consider taking an alternate approach in trying to
determine which quality weight to take instead of trying to choose between patients and
non-patients. Instead of trying to see which group, patients or non-patients, is right,
perhaps we should consider the possibility that neither group is wrong. I will later discuss
the idea that both groups are merely evaluating the health states from different, but both
accurate, perspectives. If this is the case, deciding between patients and non-patients is
not the right choice to make. Instead, we might consider the problem from a more
abstract standpoint, considering instead the ethical and economic implications of
choosing either a higher or a lower quality weight, regardless of which group provided
that number. Ultimately, I posit that we should take the lower number. In many instances
this will imply more spending on health states; however, I believe it is our moral
imperative to give more rather than less to help treat health problems.
Before we can reach this conclusion and understand why depression causes us to
consider the question of which quality weight to choose differently, we need to
understand both the context of the question (in terms of deciding how to allocate scarce
health care resources) and also the other argument between patient and non-patient
assigned quality weights. I start with the background. First, I will explain our different
methods for finding quality weights and how they are used in allocating health care
resources. Next, I will discuss the disability paradox, the problems it poses, and the
arguments people give for either patients or non-patients. After that, I will explain how
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depression defies the trend of the disability paradox, and causes our prior arguments to
contradict themselves, thus leading us to a different understanding of how to decide
different quality weights. I examine the arguments for choosing higher or lower quality
weights, and conclude that because we have a moral imperative to provide health care
resources to those in need, particularly those who are disadvantaged, we should take the
lower quality weights and err on the side of overspending on health states. Ultimately,
this will create the greatest change in funding for health states, such as depression, that go
against the disability paradox. Finally, I address the economic trade-offs we have to
consider if we make the decision to overspend.
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CHAPTER I: HEALTH STATES AND QUALITY WEIGHTS

How We Compare Health States that Seem Incomparable

When evaluating the effectiveness of different healthcare treatments, we consider
several factors: how the treatment will affect life expectancy (mortality) and how it will
affect the quality of life experienced during those years (morbidity) (Gudex et al. 1996,
Weinstein, Torrance, and McGuire, 2009). Measuring just one side of this equation will
not adequately capture how a treatment can impact someone’s life. We can see this if we
consider the following example.
Two people are in a car together and get into a bad accident. One ends up paralyzed
below the waist and severely mentally handicapped due to head trauma. The other breaks
their leg. Let’s assume that neither person’s life is shortened due to the accident and
ensuing injuries. If we only measure impact on mortality, both people are alive, and
therefore the “same.” But this seems wrong for several reasons; our intuition alone tells
us that a broken leg is not the same as paraplegia and a mental handicap. We can also see
how the person with paraplegia will need more care and medical attention than the person
with the broken leg in order to function in daily activities. Thus, we can see the value in
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measuring both quality and quantity of life when evaluating the effectiveness of
treatments.
This makes it clear that in order to allocate healthcare effectively, researchers need a
measure that captures the impact of a health state on both mortality and morbidity. In
order to do this, we assign a value to the quality of life one experiences each year as a
result of a health state, thus weighting each year according to its quality (Nord, 1992,
Guyatt, 1993, Brazier, 1999, Weinstein, Torrance, and McGuire, 2009). This will reflect
the impact on length of life as well as the change in quality. We call this measure qualityadjusted life years, or QALYs. Health economists can use changes in QALYs to assess
the benefits of treatments; the degree to which a treatment improves quality or length of
life will be captured by a QALY measure.
In order to calculate QALYs we first need to assign quality weights to health states.3
We could have health experts assign different values to each health state according to
their expert assessment. But we tend to believe that it is valuable to incorporate not just
the judgments of health care professionals, but also the preferences of the general
population, when attempting to assign numbers to the quality of life experienced with
different health states (Nord, 1992, Schwappach, 2002). Since QALYs are used on a
societal and not just an individual level, it seems valuable to have a number that reflects
society’s values, not just expert ones. Furthermore, all people have a vested interest – not
only is the money for health care spending coming predominately from tax dollars,
people are all potential patients for some if not most health stateNord, 1992, Gudex et al.
1996).
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Quality weights can also be called health state utilities.
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So in the interest of incorporating the public’s preferences for different health states,
we conduct special types of surveys, designed by experts to elicit people’s judgments of
the quality of life attached to various health states. These surveys are sometimes called
preference elicitation surveys, and the responses represent the quality weights people
assign to different health states. There are four main preference elicitation surveys. These
are visual analogue scale (VAS, or Rating Scale, RS), standard gamble (SG), time tradeoff (TTO), and person trade-off (PTO) (Brazier, 1999).
While each of these four approaches will have a different metric, all responses can
be converted into quality weights. The scale for quality weights ranges from 0,
representing death, to 1, representing full or perfect health (Nord, 1992, Gudex et al.
1996, Brazier, 1999). A quality weight of .95 would indicate a health state with only a
small impact on quality of life, while a quality weight of .4 for one life year would
indicate very poor quality of life.
Changes in quality weights or QALYs are predominately used in cost-effectiveness
analyses (Weinstein, Torrance, and McGuire, 2009, Broome, 2003). The impact of a
treatment for a health state can be measured in the relative gain or loss of quality-adjusted
life years, and researchers or analysts can compare relative gains or losses to costs to
evaluate cost-effectiveness (Weinstein, Torrance, and McGuire, 2009, Broome, 2003).
Quality weights and QALY values can help analysts rank health states in terms of impact
on quality of life – they will help us see clearly which health states are the most and least
severe, and thus, from a governmental point of view, will guide us in determining where
to allocate money for research into more effective treatments, and what to cover with
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insurance or national health care (Weinstein, Torrance, and McGuire, 2009, Broome,
2003).
This chapter will briefly explain how each of these preference-based health state
valuation methods works before explaining the other role that health state utilities play, as
metrics of effect in cost-effectiveness analyses.

Quality Weights – Preference-Based Elicitation Methods

As mentioned above, there are four methods used to elicit people’s judgments of
the quality of life attached to various health states. All of the methods of preferencebased elicitation have the same goal of applying a quantitative value to the quality of life
experienced by a patient with a particular health state. They all attempt to elicit the value
an individual would place on being in or escaping a particular health state. Each approach
asks a slightly different question (Brazier, 1996, Bleichrodt and Johanneson, 1997).

Visual Analogue Scale, (VAS or Rating Scale, RS)

This method is the most straightforward of the four approaches. The rating scale
method asks respondents to place several different health conditions on a scale to directly
rank them against each other. This is often done by literally giving the patients a scale on
a piece of paper and asking them to place the health states in question on the line. The
ends of the line are typically death or worst possible health on one side, and perfect
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health on the other. Respondents may be asked to rank many different health states at
once or place them on the scale one at a time. The line can either be vertical or horizontal,
can range from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 100, and may or may not have marked intervals
(Brazier et al. 1999). Rating scale is widely used to evaluate health states, in part because
it simple and easy to use (Brazier et al. 1999).

Standard Gamble (SG)

Standard Gamble questions ask people about their willingness to risk their life or
health in order to escape a particular health state. A standard gamble question would ask:
“if you could undergo a treatment that would cure you of Health State X, what risk of
death due to that treatment would you accept and yet still choose to undergo the
treatment?” To use a concrete example, a standard gamble question might ask the
respondent to give the risk of death they would accept in order to be cured of blindness.
The answers are given in a percentage scale; an answer closer to 100% would indicate
that a respondent considers that health state particularly terrible. If you are willing to
accept a 60% chance of death to be cured of a health state, you clearly consider it to have
a very low quality of life. Whereas if you are only willing to accept a 2% chance of death
for a cure to a particular health state, you probably think that health state isn’t all that
bad, and you would rather not risk death to cure yourself of it (Green et al., 2000, Brazier
et al. 1999).
Standard Gamble questions were developed based on Von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory (Green et al. 2000).
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Time Trade-Off (TTO)

The time trade-off method is closely related to standard gamble. Torrance et al.
(1972) developed TTO as a counter to standard gamble (Brazier et al 1999). Instead of
asking people to consider what risk of death they would accept, it asks respondents to
determine a number of health years they would be willing to give up in order to be cured
of a certain health state (it is assumed that the health state has no impact on life
expectancy and that one would live an average number of years unless one chose to make
the trade). A time trade-off question would ask: “Consider that you have Health State X,
and that you have 65 years left to live. How many years of life would you give up to live
in full health?” So in response to a time trade-off question, someone might say that they
would give up 15 years of life with depression to live in full health, meaning that they
would rather live for 50 years in full health over 65 years with depression. The more
years of life given up, the more severe and terrible an individual considers a health state
(Green et al. 2000).

Person Trade-Off (PTO)

The first three methods ask the respondent to consider themselves and what value
they personally place on different health states. Person trade-off questions, on the other
hand, ask respondents to consider how they would evaluate others with health states with
themselves as an impartial third party.
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An individual is asked to compare two different health outcomes to indirectly
state which is worse than the other. A person trade-off question would ask: “imagine you
can cure 100 people of Disease A, or you can cure X number of people with Disease B.
What number x would there have to be to cause you to choose to cure that group of
Disease B?” If you choose a larger number than 100 to cure of Disease B, you consider
Disease A worse. If you choose a smaller number than 100, you consider Disease B
worse. For example, someone might say that they would cure 70 paraplegics over 100
blind people because they consider paraplegia relatively worse than blindness, to that
particular degree. But alternatively, in the choice between 100 blind people and 60
paraplegics, they might make the opposite choice, and choose the blind patients instead,
depending on the relative weight they place on each health state (Green et al. 2000).

An important caveat:

Much literature has been devoted to the fact that each of these four methods, SG,
TTO, PTO, RS, have the problematic tendency of providing different quality weights for
the same diseases (Brazier et al. 1999, Essink-Bot et al. 1990, Green, Brazier, & Deverill,
2000, CITE?). For example, take the case of a moderate physical disability described by
Bleichrodt and Johanneson (1996). Respondents rated the health state using RS, TTO,
and SG. Rating scale gave a quality weight of .406, time trade-off gave a value of .578,
and SG gave a value of .671. These answers are significantly different at a 99%
confidence level (Bleichrodt & Johanneson, 1997).
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It is important to note that we will probably never get a unified answer, as each
question is asking something different. However, it is worth considering that we may
need to decide which elicitation method is most valid and predominately use that
particular approach. While the question of which survey type to use and which is more
accurate merits plenty of attention, it is not the focus of my argument, and thus I set aside
this topic in order to consider other questions.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Quality Weights

Quality weights play a dual role. They can be used for ranking health states as
previously discussed, but they also matter in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of
treatments. In cost-effectiveness analysis, we can compare the net QALY gain in order to
evaluate the benefit of a particular health intervention, and then we can compare that
against the cost of the treatment in order to determine a cost-effectiveness ratio.
Because QALYs play a unique role as a metric by which we can compare wildly
different health states, their incorporation into cost-effectiveness analysis lends it a
similar universality. We can use cost-effectiveness analysis of cost per QALY gained to
compare two different treatments aiming to improve the condition of someone with the
same disease, or compare between two treatments for different diseases.
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Consider the following hypothetical example. You are a patient with arthritis.
Treatment A will give you .15 QALY gain for a cost of $600. Treatment B will give you
a QALY gain of .2 for $1000. If you calculate the ratio of cost of treatment to the QALY
gain, you can see that Treatment A is the more efficient option, since it is lower cost per
QALY gained, and thus even though your QALY gain is slightly smaller, it produces a
better ratio of cost to effect.
We can also use comparisons of cost per QALY gained to compare treatments
that are targeting different health states. Imagine the following scenario. You are
choosing between two patients. One has terrible migraines, which has a quality weight of
.567 (Salomon et al. 2010). The other has untreated and uncontrolled asthma, with a
quality weight of .868 (Salomon et al, 2010). The money you have, $300, dollars, is
exactly the right amount to cure either of them, returning either to a QALY per year of 1,
or perfect health.
The QALY gain from curing the person with migraines is .433 per year, while the
gain from curing the person with asthmas is .132 QALYs per year (Salomon et al, 2010).
The treatment for the patient with migraines is clearly most cost-effective because it
produces a better return for the same dollar amount, and thus the cost-effective analysis
would suggest choosing to treat migraines over asthma in this scenario.
These examples show the role that quality weights can plan in determining the
cost-effectiveness of different treatments. This would be very straightforward analysis if
we had a definitive quality weight for all health states. However, researchers realized that
different respondent groups might have different biases causing them to respond in
different ways.
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For example, it seems plausible to wonder if age would provide different
responses to something like time trade-off, or if certain levels of education would make
one more or less risk-averse. A study done by Sackett and Torrance found some evidence
suggesting that age had impacts on the way respondents evaluated health states (1978).
Ubel et al. found some similar evidence that age had an impact on the way that people
evaluated health states (2005). However, Salomon et al. in the Global Burden of Disease
Study in 2010 found very little evidence of demographic context altering results after
doing large-scale comparisons of results from extremely diverse groups (2010).
However, there is one divide that seems to fairly clearly lead respondents to give
responses that are significantly different; patients, when evaluating a health state that they
have experienced or are experiencing, give answers that are different from those given by
non-patients who have never experienced that same health state (Albrecht and Devlieger,
1999). This is often called the Disability Paradox.
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CHAPTER II: THE DISABILITY PARADOX

If we look at the health state evaluations provided by patients and non-patients
separately instead of aggregately, we discover an apparent paradox, called the Disability
Paradox (Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999). The popular conception is that to have high
quality of life, one must have full health – but patients’ reported quality of life defies this
logic (Goode, 1994, Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999). Patients consistently rate their own
health states as higher than the general public rates them (Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999).
Consider kidney disease being treated with dialysis. Non-patients who have never
undergone dialysis treatments value life with dialysis at .39, which means they would
agree to a treatment with a greater than 60% risk of death if there was a 39% chance it
would rid them of kidney disease. Another way to consider it is that they would give up
more than 60% of their remaining lifespan in order to enjoy full health and not have to
undergo dialysis. In contrast, dialysis patients placed their quality of life with dialysis at
.56 (Sackett and Torrance, 1978, De Wit, Busschback, and De Charro, 2000). This means
that patients would give up just barely more than 40% of their remaining life years to be
free from dialysis, a percent dwarfed by the 60% that non-patients are willing to forego.
The Disability Paradox is thus a paradox because the patients’ ratings of their
quality of life in various health states do not match the expectations the rest of the
population holds for what their quality of life would be. As Albrecht and Devlieger point
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out, a high quality of life is normally characterized as one with full health, complete life
satisfaction, and an overall positive experience of well-being (Albrecht & Devlieger
1999). When we consider someone with a severe and chronic disability (disability is the
term employed by Albrecht and Devlieger and thus repeated here), by definition they lack
“full health.” Hence our confusion and the paradox; how can someone without access to
full health experience a state we traditionally define as including full health?
The Disability Paradox becomes problematic when we consider the role of quality
weights in cost-effectiveness analysis. We no longer have one quality weight assigned to
a health state, we have two. Thus we are forced to consider the question; who should we
listen to, patients or non-patients? The different quality weights they provide will lead to
very different cost-effectiveness ratios. We need a singular evaluation of health state
utility, so we need to decide which quality weight to consider as the value for that
particular health state.
There are arguments on both side of the aisle. But before we examine those and
the pros and cons of picking one group over the other, let us determine if there are any
factors involved in the survey process or any features of either group that might suggest
that one group is “wrong.”

Patient Responses

First, let’s look at patients, and attempt to determine if there is anything that might
suggest some sort of error. We can see if there is any factor about patients could cause
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their assessments of the quality of life they experience with a health state to no longer
serve as an accurate reflection.
One possibility is that patients might alter their scale of quality of life in response
to a new health state; in other words, their “10” with a disease would be equivalent to a
“7” on the scale of a healthy person . Quality scales are open to personal interpretation
and subjectivity, and it seems plausible that personal assessments of quality could change
in relation to life events. Individual definitions of “high quality of life” have the potential
to vary wildly, particularly if one’s personal frame of reference has been irrevocably
shifted thanks to a disability or a disease (Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson 2003). This
phenomenon is referred to as “scale recalibration” or “response shift” (Ubel et al, 2005,
Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson 2003, Schwartz et al. 2006).
In general, increasing sample size could control for this potential for error by
generalizing towards a mean. But if this is not the case, we should consider whether or
not patients of a particular health state might have unilaterally recalibrated their sense of
high quality of life in accordance with their new health state.
This is reinforced by the fact that research has shown that the conversational
context of a survey can shift a patient’s response, indicating that their scale of quality of
life is potentially largely (and at least partially) relative. This was tested by conducting
interviews in which the interviewers gave different introductions to different groups of
respondents participating in phone interviews (Ubel et al. 2005). One version of the
introduction highlighted the interviewee as a patient, noting their status as a member of a
group with a particular health state, and asked about their quality of life relative to that
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group. The other version of the survey introduction cited the individual as part of a larger
group unaffiliated with that health status.
The results of this test showed that conversational context could indeed influence
an individual’s reported quality of life. Individuals who compared their quality of life
with others who shared their health state rated their quality of life as on average higher
than those who compared it to a population who did not have their health state. The
researchers argued that this showed that patients were considering that on a scale where
everyone was in their health state, they were relatively high, but then their answers
shifted downwards when they compared themselves to “normal” health (Ubel et al.
2005).
Ubel et al. also conducted a study to test for overall scale recalibration (2005).
Respondents were given slightly varied interview questions depending on different
demographic factors, and it showed that people have some tendencies to adjust their
personal health scale based on age and health state. However, further studies conducted
by Ubel and others have sought to show the impact of scale recalibration and found very
little evidence to support its occurrence. This suggests that scale recalibration, even in
those small incidences where it occurs to a small degree, is not an important factor in
driving the disability paradox. These conflicting results mean that we cannot be sure
whether or not scale recalibration causes patients to rate their quality of life as higher
than they should (Schwartz et al 2006).
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Non-Patient Responses

Now let’s turn to non-patient responses, and see if there is something about the
way that the general population evaluates quality of life that could indicate that the
quality weights they assign to health states are too low, and do not accurately reflect the
quality of life experienced in different health states.
There is a fairly large body of evidence that suggests that people are bad at
predictions of future states, particularly hedonic predictions. This is commonly attributed
to several factors, two of which could play large roles in causing non-patients to assign
lower quality weights to health states than they actually merit. (There are many other
factors possibly at fault, but for now I am addressing only these two major potential
causes in detail.)
The first potential factor is a focusing illusion. A focusing illusion refers to when
we overemphasize the things that will change thanks to an event and fail to note what will
stay the same (Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson 2005). Consider a case where you are in a
bad accident and end up having to amputate both legs below the knee. When people
picture the impact that will have on their lives and how they will feel after the event, they
consider limited mobility and the ways in which that will change their current behaviors;
they worry about not being able to walk or run again.
Fixated on the negative impacts, people fail to note the multitude of positive
aspects in their lives that would be unaffected by the accident. They could still have a
happy life with a loving family, play with pets and friends and children, listen to music,
watch sunsets, enjoy great food and company, and more; essentially, a person could
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engage in nearly every activity that someone might associate with a wonderful life. While
their quality of life might decrease somewhat relative to their life before the accident
(though even that is up for debate in cases such as deafness) it is very possible that it is
not as bad as they think it will be. This could indicate that non-patients underestimate the
quality of life that those living with a health state experience.
Failing to consider or adequately predict adaptation is another potential factor
(Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson 2003). People often fail to perceive how well they will be
able to emotionally adapt to new circumstances, which they are in fact quite good at
doing (Ubel, Ubel et al 2005, Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson, 2003). Emotional
adaptation can occur consciously, when people work to find new means of emotional
fulfillment or attaining happiness (Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2003). For example, in
the case of the amputee, they may have originally loved dancing, but now realize and
develop a deep love for music, from which they gain the same level of joy as they gained
from dancing.
It can also happen unconsciously; studies show that over time, both positive and
negative emotional reactions fade. When predicting how an event or life change will
make them feel, people can rarely see past the initial, strong emotional reaction, and they
fail to consider how that will dissipate over time.
There are several different ways in which we fail to foresee how we will
emotionally adapt, and this means that non-patients will tend to underestimate how well
they will be able to cope with the loss of their legs. You might only consider one thing
that you will be unable to do such as a particular hobby you can no longer pursue, and
fail to appreciate the broader context of other activities that share similar value and
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function. In the case of the amputee, you might be an avid runner who likes to race, and
saddened by the fact that you will no longer be able to do this, thus missing the fact that
you could enjoy a similar type of physical competition by participating in wheelchair
races. Or, you might be so intent upon how one thing will negatively impact you, and fail
to see other more positive events that will occur and balance it out. For example, you
might be solely thinking about the impact on your mobility throughout your lifetime, and
fail to consider the many positive events that will occur at the same time, like falling in
love, starting a family, and more. Finally, people tend to have trouble remembering both
the degree to which and how quickly emotional reactions fade. While you might be
initially very upset by the loss of your legs, humans are adept at pushing away negative
emotions, and thus the sharpness of your emotional pain will fade more rapidly than you
tend to expect.
Before we accept that non-patients are inaccurately evaluating quality of life for
health states, we need to consider several factors that play a role in whether or not
focusing illusions and a failure to consider adaptation actually alter non-patient health
state preference scores.
First, a study conducted by Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson found that reducing
focusing illusions did not cause non-patients evaluations of quality of life to increase
(2003). This group was careful to note that this study alone does not refute the potential
influence of a focusing illusion, suggesting that the lack of impact could be due to the
fact that the researchers did not adequately correct for focusing illusions (Ubel,
Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2003). However, they also noted that they did not consider this
outcome likely.
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Another important problem is that both the focusing illusion might be impactful
solely in cases where a health state has a damaging impact on one particular area of life,
but leaves others unscathed. Hence the potential for a focusing illusion in an example like
below-knee amputation where mobility would be greatly impacted, but one’s ability to
function mentally and socially would be unimpaired. Similarly, we can see potential
problems with focusing illusions in health states like deafness, blindness, anxiety
disorders, and other health states that particularly affect one area of life. A focusing
illusion or an overweighting of physicality would be a less likely cause of the disparity
between patients and non-patients when the health state in question impacts many areas
of life. An example could be an accident that leaves an individual both mentally and
physically handicapped to the degree that they are unable to care for themselves or live
unassisted ever again.
Furthermore, Ubel, Loewenstein &Jepson note that perhaps a better application
for a focusing illusion would be trivial scenarios with short-term consequences, but not
chronic, deeply damaging health states in which the consequences are much broader and
longer-lasting (2005). This could account for the presence of a focusing illusion in other
studies that examined more trivial matters (e.g. students’ ability to predict how upset they
would be about receiving a bad grade), and the fact that it seems to not play a role in the
way that patients evaluate health states.
We are left with adaptation and its potential role in the disability paradox. Several
studies have been conducted to test for the degree to which considering adaptation might
change general population evaluations of health states. There are several ways to bring
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adaptation to the fore in a non-patients mind in order to understand the impact it has on
health state preference scores.
Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson asked all their respondents to consider adaptation,
and come up with examples of ways they had adapted to adverse circumstances in their
pasts (2005). This led them to increase their quality weights for health states. However, in
one of the three experiments, they felt that this actually evidenced a problem, which
caused them to doubt the conclusion that underestimating adaptation caused patients to
inaccurately evaluate health states. They used a previous experiment done by Schkade
and Kahneman in 1998 to serve as the accurate values they were attempting to replicate,
and found that asking participants to consider adaptation actually pushed their answers
away from those found by Schkade and Kahneman. This led them to the conclusion that
though they could cause non-patients’ responses to rise, this did not inherently imply that
they were becoming more accurate, and suggested that it might in fact mean the opposite
(Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson, 2005).
Another group of researchers also hoped to evaluate the effect of underestimating
adaptation and correcting for it on non-patient responses. Damschroder et al. gave
“adaptation exercises” to a survey group before giving them a health state valuation
survey to see if it altered their results and brought them closer to those of patients
(Damscrhoder, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel, 2005).
Damschroder et al. gave a survey in which respondents considered a person
tradeoff (PTO) elicitation (Damscrhoder, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel, 2005). Respondents
chose between saving the lives of 100 previously health patients or saving 100 patients
with pre-existing paraplegia. Respondents were also asked to choose the number of
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patients with pre-existing paraplegia they would have to be able to save to equal the value
of saving the 100 previously perfectly health patients. This helps determine an
indifference point, or the relative value people assign to perfectly healthy people versus
people with paraplegia (Damscrhoder, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel, 2005).
Damschroder et al. found that post adaptation exercises non-patients placed
significantly higher value on the lives of patients with paraplegia relative to what they
had valued paraplegia before the adaptation exercises (Damscrhoder, Zikmund-Fisher,
and Ubel, 2005). This was particularly significant when they were asked to consider new
onset paraplegia. People were far more inclined to save the lives of someone with
existing paraplegia than someone with new onset of paraplegia (Damscrhoder, ZikmundFisher, and Ubel, 2005). This could suggest that increased understanding of adaptation
could alter people’s evaluations of health states. However, the warnings given by Ubel,
Loewenstein, & Jepson about shifts in responses not necessarily representing an increase
in accuracy of the answers still stand as an important caveat to consider (2003).
As with patients, it is difficult to say whether or not these potential errors truly
lead non-patients to incorrectly evaluate the quality of life attached to various health
states. A focusing illusion could mislead predictions of quality of life, but the evidence of
its presence is hazy and thus it is hard to determine whether or not a focusing illusion
alters non-patient responses. The evidence for non-patients underestimating the power of
emotional adaptation is somewhat stronger, but still leaves us unsure as to whether or not
it is a sufficiently confounding factor so as to consistently make non-patients significantly
underestimate the quality of life experienced in health states. Thus it seems that neither
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factor is entirely conclusive in determining whether or not non-patients evaluations are
inaccurate reflections of the quality of life experienced with different health states.

Patients vs. Non-Patients

After considering the possible factors that could lead either group to over- or
under-predict the quality weights of health states, we can see that both groups have
potentially confounding factors influencing the way they respond (Ubel et al 2005, Ubel,
Loewenstein & Jepson, 2003, Damscrhoder, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel, 2005). We can
see potential areas for error in the responses of either group, and this is useful in that it
allows us to see areas for increased accuracy. However it gives us little in terms of
deciding which group’s evaluations to heed. Many authors have posited reasons why one
group is “wrong,” but there are counterarguments to any point that might guide us to
choose one side over the other. Even if we can eliminate confounding factors from the
answers of either group, it does not seem that we can utterly eliminate the discrepancy in
responses.
Perhaps neither group is wrong. We need one number for both clarity and for use
in cost-effectiveness analysis, but that does not imply that one group’s evaluations are
inaccurate. In his essay “Ethical Issues in The Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the
Prioritization of Health Care Resources” Dan Brock briefly mentions what he calls “the
perspectives problem” (Brock, 2004). He suggests that because patients have adapted to
their health states, they consider those health states from entirely different but equally
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accurate perspectives as those of non-patients, who consider the same health state from
the perspective of hoping never to experience it. Having a health state may have
fundamentally changed a patient’s preferences; they may be aware that they would have
rated that same health state differently from the perspective of full health, but that does
not change the way they now consider it (Brock 2004, Ubel, Richardson, and Pinto
Prades, 1999).
Let’s consider an example. Imagine a person with deafness. Before her hearing
loss, she might have loved to go to concerts and play the piano. She derived a great deal
of joy from these two activities, and without them, her life is different. Now that she is
deaf, she has taken up painting, started teaching English sign language, and has joined a
book club. She might miss playing the piano, but she is grateful for the fact that she isn’t
bothered by the road construction outside her apartment. Her evaluation of her quality of
life valued concerts and playing the piano very highly before she lost her hearing. She
would have imagined deafness as terrible since it would rob her of these two important
parts of her life. Now she considers different activities and aspects of her life, and her
evaluation of deafness comes from an entirely different perspective. Neither judgment is
wrong, as both reflect different perceptions of deafness.
Like a patient, a non-patient looks at a health state and considers that health state
relative to their state of full health. Theirs answers are two sides to the same coin. They
may underestimate how well they will adapt to having that health state, but that does not
make their desire to avoid that health state that much less intense.
Consider an analogy. Two people are standing at opposite corners of an
intersection, waiting to cross the street. While they are waiting, there is an accident and
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two cars collide in the middle of the intersection. When the police are writing the
accident report, they ask both of the pedestrians for their account of the accident. Both
tell the same basic story; two cars crashed into one another. But each person has a
slightly different take on the accident; which car swerved more, which one braked first.
This is because the pedestrians are quite literally looking at the accident from different
angles. We might check to see if there are any reasons that one person might make a
mistake in their version of the accident; perhaps one person is partially blind, or one of
them looked down at their phone right at the instant of collision. But if we do not have
clear evidence that one person is erroneous in their report, we are apt to assume that both
accounts are reasonable. The same logic makes sense in the case of considering how a
patient and a non-patient evaluate health states – they are looking at the situation from
different angles.
If we decide that it is true that neither side is wrong; then we cannot denounce one
group and choose the other on those grounds. Instead, we turn to considering the ethical
and economic impacts of choosing one group versus the other. Let’s consider first what it
means to choose the non-patient responses.

Ethical and Economic Arguments for Choosing Patient or Non-Patient
Evaluations

Quality weights for health states have traditionally been drawn from general
population evaluations. As Gudex et al. put it, the fact that general population
assessments of health state quality weights was a matter of “general agreement” (1996).
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It was not until recently that the differentiation between patient and non-patient responses
began to receive intense examination and researchers began to argue for the patient side.
On the non-patient side, some argue that non-patient assessments are not tainted
by the same self-interest that might guide a patient to misrepresent their health state.
However, this does not make sense in the context of the disability paradox. If patients
were attempting to act in their own self-interest and garner more resources and spending
towards their health state, it seems that they would rank them as worse than non-patients
do. But as we know, this is the opposite of how the two respondent groups compare.
Another point is that non-patients are all potential patients for some health state,
which gives them a right to help determine the level of resources allocated to any health
state (Gudex et al. 1996). Furthermore, since cost-effectiveness analyses that rely on
quality weights can and do play a role in government spending on healthcare, nonpatients as taxpayers have the same right as patients in helping determine, albeit
indirectly, how their tax dollars are divvied out (Nord, 1992, Gudex et al, 1996).
Alternatively, patients provide informed, knowledge- and experience-based
preferences, while non-patients can only provide predictions (Brock, 2004). Put this way,
it seems obvious. In another scenario, we would easily choose the educated, informed
response over the guess. However, there are reasons, such as the ones discussed prior,
which lead people to believe that patients quality weights might be overestimates of their
quality of life, and thus caution against assuming that the patient answers are inherently
superior to those of non-patients.
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First, let’s consider the ethical and economic implications of choosing non-patient
quality weights. Because their preference scores are lower, health states as evaluated
using non-patient QALYs will be considered relatively more severe than they would be if
we took patient evaluations. As was previously explained, this means that it will be more
valuable to cure patients and return them to perfect health according to cost-effectiveness
analysis. This means that we will most likely allocate more resources to spending and
coverage of treatment costs because we consider the health states more severe.
However, many people have noted that this can actually pose a disadvantage to
patients. Dan Brock, in his essay “Ethical Issues in The Use of Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis,” provides several cases in which a lower QALY score could disadvantage a
patient (Brock, 2004).
First, a lower QALY weight will provide less benefit for treatments that extended
life the same number of years(Brock, 2004). Imagine two people. Person A has severely
impaired vision, giving her a QALY weight of .809 (Salomon et al. 2010). Person B is in
perfect health, thus she has a QALY score of 1. If you were to give Person A five more
years of life, she would gain 4.045 QALYs (ignoring discounting). If you were to give
Person B five more years of life, she would gain 5 QALYs. Thus you should choose
Person B because of her greater QALY gain. Both the people need the same treatment,
but Person A is discriminated against because she already has a disability.
This seems to pose a moral problem in that we are placing less value on the life of
a person with a disability purely because they have a disability. If we choose not to
extend their lives thanks purely to their disability making it less cost-effective, then we
seem to be considering that life less valuable, which some find morally problematic.
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However, in his essay “Health Care Resource Prioritization and Rationing: Why
Is It So Difficult?” Dan Brock notes that this worry about the undervaluing of lifeextension for disabled people does not take into account the differences in the way we
consider life-saving treatments and health-improving treatments (2007). If we truly do
not differentiate between the two concepts: “…we should be indifferent between saving
one person’s life who will live one year in full health, and preventing 20 people from
suffering…hearing loss [with a QALYof .95]…for one year” (Brock 2007). Yet people
tend to prefer saving the life over preventing the hearing loss, which seems to indicate
that the two are not truly considered equivalent. This is called the rule of rescue, referring
to the general tendency of people to favor life-saving interventions over health-improving
treatments. Even if a life extension treatment is significantly more expensive, our
psychological tendency holds fast; we will choose the life extension (Brock, 2007, Ubel,
Richardson, and Pinto Prades, 1999)
Our largely steadfast adherence to the rule of rescue seems to undermine the
worry that choosing lower quality weights will undervalue life-saving interventions.
Unless we abandon our tendency to honor the rule of rescue and start strictly following
cost-effectiveness analysis in our decisions regarding life-extension versus health
improvement, we will not place a significant disadvantage on disabled persons.
In sum, choosing non-patient values means we will spend more overall on
treatments for disabled persons. If we choose this option, we need to consider the
economic trade-offs that will come with allocating more to individual health states. This
money will have to come from somewhere, and whether that is from spending less on
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health states we consider less severe or from other areas of the budget is something we
will have to decide if we choose this option.
If non-patient assigned quality weights are indeed overestimating the negative
impact of health states and underestimating the quality of life experienced in different
health states, then we run the risk of overspending on health states that do not need as
much as we are allocating to them, which could create inefficiencies in health spending
and draw money away from other areas where it is more desperately needed.
Now let’s turn to the other side, and consider the ethical and economic
implications of choosing patient-assigned quality weights. If we choose patient responses,
we are choosing the overall higher quality weights. This means that most health states
will be considered less serious. The cost-effectiveness ratios will be less favorable, as less
benefit will be returned from curing a health state with a higher quality weight. Thus we
will allocate less spending to each health state.
Choosing patient evaluations of health states eliminates some of the concerns
about disadvantaging patients; particular in terms of life-extension treatments as the
disadvantage will not be as severe, relatively speaking. The disadvantage to patients
thanks to cost-effectiveness analysis equating quality to value is still present and still
needs to be addressed, but between the two options, choosing to heed patient responses
will provide a better ratio.
It also needs to be considered that considering health states as less serious may
present problems. Considering a health state as less serious will result in less funding
partially due to an inferior cost-effectiveness ratio. This decrease in spending may
preclude a patient from adapting in the ways patients were previously capable of doing,
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particularly if those patients’ adaptation was at all aided by resources that stemmed from
that larger amount of spending.
So to sum up the results of choosing patient values, we will consider health states
less serious and thus spend less to help treat them, though we may spend relatively more
on life-extension treatments. If patients are overestimating their quality of life, this choice
would mean underspending on health states that actually need more resources allocated
towards them and overall more money.
Choosing between patient and non-patient evaluations of health states is
enormously challenging task, and one that many authors have spent a great deal of time
and energy debating, weighing in on where potential areas for over or underestimation
are on either side of the equation. The question becomes even more complicated when we
realize that the disability paradox is not universal. There is a notable exception to the
disability paradox; depression defies the rule of patients placing their quality of life as
higher than non-patients, with patients rating their quality of life as significantly lower
than the ratings given by non-patients. In the next section we will discuss this anomaly
and examine the data that demonstrates how depression defies the disability paradox.
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CHAPTER III: THE ANOMALY OF DEPRESSION

We see the Disability Paradox almost everywhere – it seems that, almost without
exception, there is a discrepancy between patient and non-patient responses. A notable
exception to this is depression.4
Unlike most other health states, non-patients give relatively higher values to the
quality of life an individual will experience when they have depression while patients
give lower values. To put it roughly, someone without depression might say that
depression is a 4 on a scale of 1 to 10, while someone with depression would say it is a 2
on the same scale.
A study done by Pyne et al. found evidence of significant differences in how
patients versus non-patients scored depression in terms of the attached quality weight
(2005). The researchers employed both Standard Gamble and Rating Scale questions to
four different groups: general population respondents, patients who had experienced but
were not currently experiencing depressive episodes, patients dealing with mild to
moderate depression, and patients with moderate to severe depression. The results
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showed that, particularly for patients with severe depression, there was a significant gap
between the individuals and the patients (Pyne et al., 2005).
In order to create the hypothetical descriptions of the levels of depression that
were given to the respondents, the researchers drew upon the Patient Health
Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) and the Medical Outcomes Study SF-12. These questionnaires
are both ways of measuring an individual’s health status, and contain questions related to
the symptoms of depression. The researchers used the symptoms in these questionnaires
and the ways in which people at different levels of depression responded to create
descriptions of the symptoms and facets of mild, moderate, and severe depression. This
created a total of 6 different descriptions, with one description based on each
questionnaire for each of the three levels of depression. It is interesting to note that the
PHQ-9 descriptions tended to produce lower quality weights overall (Pyne et al., 2005).
There is a clear overall trend downwards in the preference scores assigned to the
three levels of depression evaluated. Furthermore, there is also a clear trend in lower
preference scores given by respondents with a more severe degree of depression.
In the SF-12 health states, the responses given by the general population
respondents and the moderate to severely depressed patients were significantly different
across every level of depression that was described.5 This trend was true for both rating
scale and standard gamble responses (Pyne et al., 2005).

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  

According to the x2 test done by Pyne et al. to compare the differences between the general population
responses and the responses of the moderate to severely depressed respondent group, all three levels were
significantly different. For mild depression, the responses were 89.5 versus 83.6, p=.04; for moderate
depression 72.2 versus 62.7,p=.001; and lastly, for severe depression 50.7 versus 42.3, p=.02.
5
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In the PHQ-9 health states, the rating scale responses held a general trend of
higher preference scores for depression health states from the general population group
compared to lower scores from the groups with current depression. Five of the six health
states showed this trend. The standard gamble questions did not provide as clear of a
trend line, however the average scores from the general population respondents for mild
and moderate depression health states were significantly higher than the preference
scores given by moderate to severely depressed respondents. The comparison between
the preference scores for severe depression can be seen in the following graphs (Pyne et
al., 2005).
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rated severe depression on a Visual Analogue Scale. As previously noted, the respondents
considered two different descriptions of depression separately; the PHQ-9 is in red and
the SF-12 is in blue. There is a clear downward trend in the responses; if they were
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accurate to the Disability Paradox, the trend should go in the opposite direction. The table
with all the original data and all the other graphs showing how respondents rated mild,
moderate, and severe depression using Standard Gamble and also how the respondents
rated mild and moderate depression using Visual Analogue Scale are in Appendix 1,
Graphs 1.1-1.6.
While determining why we underestimate depression is interesting, it is not within
the scope of this paper. Divining that particular “why” would require performing
additional carefully constructed surveys (and thus require resources and time currently
not at hand). Thus we are forced to set it aside for now, and answer another, equally
important question; what are the implications of depression’s unusual preference scores?
As was previously discussed, the difference between patient and non-patient
quality weights creates problems, particularly when we consider the distinctly different
cost effectiveness analyses we will see when we use the different numbers. In the case of
depression, the relatively anomalous nature of the differences in answers given by the
two respondent groups makes this particularly important.
We previously discussed the ethical and economic implications of choosing either
patients or non-patients and saw how those differentially affected spending. In most
cases, our traditional tendency to go with the general population ratings will lead us to
consider health states more severe than they actually are, and thus to consider it more
cost-effective to treat them. But in the case of depression, we see the exact opposite
occur. If we take the non-patient evaluation of depression, we run the risk of
underestimating the severity of depression and thus spending less than we should.
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The previous explanations of the implications of choosing either side, patients of
non-patients, now seem odd because the results of choosing either side are now
associated with the other, opposing argument. Our arguments for choosing patient values
on the grounds that they are more efficient and will not run the risk of overspending stand
in opposition to what happens in the case of depression. A similar problem appears when
we consider our arguments for non-patient responses.
This leads me to wonder if choosing between different quality weights on the
basis of which group of respondents provided them could be the wrong method of
choosing. We already discussed the implications of choosing one group or the other, but
we should consider that question more abstractly. If instead of choosing between patients
or non-patients we consider choosing between a higher quality weight and a lower quality
weight, we can see similar implications but without the confusing arguments tied to
patient or non-patient responses.
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CHAPTER IV: REFRAMING THE QUESTION
Higher versus Lower Quality Weights

If we reframe the question of which quality weight to choose as a decision
between a higher bracket and a lower bracket as opposed to deciding between the groups
that defined those, the way we consider the choice becomes slightly different. Instead of
examining both patients and non-patients and trying to find reasons that either group
would overestimate or underestimate health related quality of life, we consider primarily
the ethical and economic impacts of choosing a higher versus a lower quality weight to
assign to a health state.
To briefly recap, choosing a higher quality weight implies that health states are
relatively less serious and have less of an impact on quality of life. Thus treating them is
less appealing as there is a smaller cost-effectiveness ratio. However, higher quality
weights also make life-extension treatments relatively more appealing as there is a larger
QALY gain. Alternatively, lower quality of life values imply that health states should be
taken more seriously and more spending should and will be allocated to address them,
particularly health states on the lower end of the quality of life spectrum, because curing
them produces a larger, more appealing cost-effectiveness ratio.

This could cause a scenario where, from a numerical basis, life-extension
treatments will be less valuable as there will be a smaller QALY gain from saving the life
of a patient who has a health state with a lower quality weight. However, as previously
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noted, the mathematical explanation does not fit with how we actually treat life-extension
treatments, and thus this worry is largely unfounded.
Thus, the question really comes down to whether we want to spend more or less
on people with disabilities. There are downsides to either side, largely hinging on our
uncertainty about the accuracy of either set of quality weights. If we choose the lower
QALY weights and they are inaccurate, we run the risk of overspending on health states
that are not as serious as we are considering them. If we choose the higher quality
weights, we run the risk of underspending on health states that are more serious than we
say.
As we have already seen, the choice is not an easy one. There are benefits and
drawbacks to either side. The evidence is split between the two, leaving us with no
empirical foundation to fall back on. Given that there are few differentiating factors that
would tip the scale to either side, it seems that our moral imperative is to choose the
option that is “better safe than sorry” and go with the lower quality weights.
The risk of underspending on health states is worse, morally speaking, than the
risk of overspending on health states. If in reality the higher evaluations of health states
are inaccurate and the actual quality of life one experiences is lower, we would have
allocated inadequate resources towards handling a health state that needed more
resources, resulting in a failure to serve those who need it. Alternatively, if we take the
lower quality weights, we might give more resources towards treatment and research
related to health states that don’t need as much help as we are giving them. While this is
inefficient, it is the morally responsible option as it does not run the risk of leaving
someone in need without the resources they require.
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Part of the rationale for this comes from the way in which depression defies the
disability paradox. The fact that depression does not fit into the mold that holds most
other health states seems to imply that there is something significantly different and
unusual about this case. If we used the higher quality weight to evaluate depression, we
would not consider it as serious as its anomalous nature seems to suggest it might be. If
we have reason to believe that depression even could be worse than the general
population thinks, that seems to suggest that we need to heed that and devote more
resources and spending to addressing it.
The argument is this; given that, thanks the disability paradox, we need to choose
between two quality weights for health states, one indicating higher quality of life and
one indicating lower. If there is a chance that the lower quality of life accurately reflects
the quality of life one experiences with a health state, we need to assume that all patients
who experience that health state might experience that low quality of life, and thus we
need to be able to provide resources and treatments to accommodate such a level.
Consider an analogy. A friend recently paid for your meal when you forgot your
wallet. She doesn’t have the receipt but you both know that the amount you owe her is
around $10. You have $29 in cash when you see her again - $9 in ones or a $20. She has
$9 on her person. This means that you can pay her either $9 or $11. In general, we
consider it better to go with $11. Because we don’t know what the exact amount you owe
her should be, we think it’s better to give her slightly more than might be owed, rather
than run the risk of underpaying her.
The parallels for this example are fairly clear. First, in a situation where we do not
know what exact amount is needed, we find it more morally acceptable to potentially
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overestimate instead of underestimating. Second, the fact that we are determining how
much to pay back a friend illustrates an important facet. If the person were paying us
back for the meal instead of vice versa, we might find it acceptable to accept the 9
dollars; we are more willing to incur that risk on ourselves. In general, we tend to find it
okay to accept individual risks, but not reasonable to assign those same risks to others.
If we have this intuition in a case that does not seem to hold great moral weight –
the difference of a dollar is arguably trivial – it seems reasonable to extrapolate this same
reasoning to scenarios where that potential extra dollar represents a great deal more. We
tend to agree that health is important, whether we think it is valuable as a means to an end
or merely in itself. Given this, it seems there is greater moral urgency in helping people
have and maintain full health. So even if we need to overspend slightly to help them
achieve that, it seems to be the morally sound decision to make, and we should err on the
side of overspending in these cases as opposed to under-spending.

CHAPTER V: ECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS
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This decision leaves an enormous problem looming. If we choose to “overspend,”
the money must come from somewhere. We must consider where the trade-off will lie
when we choose to heed the lower quality weights assigned to health states. We could
either draw the money from less severe health states, thus rationing our limited health
care resources, or we could find others areas in the budget from which to draw it. First,
we consider rationing, and whether it is a viable option.
Choosing to value health states at a lower quality of life will, as previously
explained, guide us towards allocating more resources towards treating them, and this
might result in withdrawing provisions of beneficial care for health states evaluated as
having higher quality of life. Prioritization of health care already tends to result in
rationing, but this might exacerbate that and make the rationing process harsher against
providing healthcare resources to people in health states that are associated with higher
quality of life.
Rationing in health care refers to the process of allocating and distributing limited
resources in healthcare. The trade-off mentioned above may involve choosing to allocate
more healthcare resources towards more serious health states, and potentially
withdrawing healthcare resources from health states that we consider less serious, and
which have higher quality weights. Rationing has a bad reputation, but as Dan Brock
points out in his essay “Health Care Resource Prioritization and Rationing: Why Is It So
Difficult?” this reputation seems to be less due to a legitimate anger at the concept and
more thanks to a lack of accurate understanding of both what rationing is and its ubiquity
(2007). Brock also notes that people’s fear of rationing is driven by a worry that if they
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support rationing they will someday be denied care they want or need, rather than a real
belief that there is a more ethical way to distribute limited resources (2007).
Rationing occurs constantly, both in day-to-day life and in health care. When we
choose to buy one food at the grocery store over another, we are rationing our limited
budget for groceries between different foods. In health care, Brock offers the example of
when doctors decide whether or not to offer a patient an MRI in order to determine if
their migraines are the sign of a brain tumor (2007). If they determine that the likelihood
of a tumor is too low to merit the expense of an MRI, they are effectively rationing
treatments.
Rationing is a necessary means of allocating limited resources. Given that our
health care resources are limited by our government’s budget, we must use rationing in
order to allocate resources efficiently and ethically – realistically, we seem unable to find
another method capable of operating within the boundary of limited resources that would
produce more ethical and efficient resource distribution. While on the surface it may
seem bad to pull resources from one health state to help another, it seems like an
inevitable facet of a system with limited resources.
If we cannot find a way a morally acceptable way to use money that is already
allocated to health care spending, we still have a moral imperative to find the money to
treat these health states according to their lower quality weight. This may mean we need
to draw money to health care from somewhere else in the federal budget.
At first this seems tricky, but closer examination allows us to see where we
should draw the money from when re-allocating funds from elsewhere in the budget. As
previously noted, we seem to have a significant moral imperative to help people have
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access to and maintain health. When we consider it carefully, we can see that we spend
on many things that do not hold the same moral imperative, such as public parades or
even public parks. While these things are valuable, they should come second to helping
people have access to different treatments for health states. While I do not have empirical
evidence to guarantee that this is where additional funding for research would come, it
seems likely that if we chose to spend more on treatment and research for health, we
would draw from areas of the budget that fall lower on the scale of moral importance. It
is worth remembering, at this point, that although we briefly considered the concern that
lower quality weights for different health states would place less moral urgency on
extending the life of patients with those health states, we realized that the rule of rescue
refutes this. Though cost-effectiveness analysis alone might tell us to draw money for
health-improvement treatments from life-extension treatments, this is an unlikely
decision for health economists to make.
It is also plausible to consider that allocating more money to health states that are
considered more severe may be costly in the short-term but provide long-term benefits
that will ultimately benefit healthcare as a whole. Perhaps the additional resources
allocated to addressing depression will result in the development of a new, most costeffective treatment that will ultimately require fewer resources to treat depression in a
more effective way than ever before. If this hypothetical new treatment required the
additional resources to develop but ultimately freed up resources to go to other health
states, it seems like the initial expense was worth it. This is not a guaranteed outcome, but
one worth exploring as a possibility.
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We should also consider carefully what health states would receive more money.
We have traditionally taken the general population preference scores for health states,
which means that in choosing to honor the lower quality weights we would not be
changing our evaluations, in most cases (Gudex et al. 2006, Sullivan 2003, Boyd et al.
1990). The case that would stand out as receiving more funding would be depression.
Depression would be one of the few health states that we would switch to considering as
having a significantly lower preference score and fewer QALYs. Thus it seems possible
that while we would have to increase funding slightly, it would not be a huge jump.

CONCLUSION
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Good health is important in such a deep, universally desired way that statements
such as “if you’ve got your health, you have everything” have been created to express its
importance. Since good and bad health states occur with some degree of randomness, we
cope with this by pooling our resources through private or governmental insurance plans.
While the desire for perfect health states is nearly infinite, the resources available to
achieve those desires are limited, even when risks are pooled and governments are
involved.
We are left with a difficult problem of how to maximize health results with those
limited funds. One of the best methods for sorting and allocating resources involves
assessing the impact of various health problems on the quality of life. This results in
QALY scores, which promise to help us work towards maximizing the quality and
duration of results for health spending.
We employ QALYs gained as a measure of the cost effectiveness of various
treatment choices. Obviously enough, rationing decisions are fraught with emotion. The
QALY approach is a method that attempts to rationally sort through various health care
choices and find the one that makes most economic sense.
As I have noted here, there are a number of pitfalls that can arise within the
QALY system. Chapter II focused on a particularly profound issue, the Disability
Paradox. This is the fact that patient and non-patient groups provide distinctly different
quality weights to health conditions as imagined versus health conditions as actually
experienced. Thus the paradox, people actually suffering almost any condition don’t
report it to lower the quality of their life as much as others would assume. Naturally, this
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has sparked a great deal of debate over which group’s quality of life numbers should be
used and whether there are psychological factors in either the patient or observer group
that make their assessments incorrect.
I believe that we should not broadly consider either patients or non-patients to be
wrong. This position is supported, in part, by the evidence surrounding patient
assessment of depression, which defies the disability paradox. Unlike almost all other
health states, depression is routinely reported to be a much worse health state by its
sufferers than how it would be assessed by non-patients. Therefore, whichever QALY
set (patient or non-patient) was chosen for all negative health states would produce an
opposite result in spending for depression than it would for all other maladies.
This has caused me to wonder if it is not better to choose from a more general
viewpoint. Instead of trying to choose between the patient and non-patient QALYs,
perhaps we should consider a blended approach, having a third party choose the higher or
lower weights. We should consider the economic and moral costs of defaulting to the
lower number of the two possibilities.
Let’s briefly consider the implications defaulting to the lower number would
have. QALY systems have traditionally used the general population’s quality weights for
health states, meaning we already use a direr, lower numeric assessment for most health
states. Since we already largely default to the lower number, the current system would,
in most cases, err on the side of over-spending. The salient exception is depression,
where choosing the patients’ lower number would call for more spending.
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If we make this choice we face some important decisions. The extra funding to
cover any additional treatments that we would choose to fund has to come from
somewhere. Whether it would come from funds pulled from health states we consider
less dire or from other areas of a federal budget we consider less morally urgent is
unknown. The moral imperative to act by allocating more resources to those suffering
from depression is clear. What the source of those funds would be is less clear.
The fact that depression defies the disability paradox suggests that the malady has
unique characteristics which have gone unrecognized. It’s worth noting that depression
not only gets a lower quality rating from patients, it gets one of the lowest quality ratings
of any affliction rated by either group. Our general adherence to the rule of rescue
applies, since these patients are among the worst off, their needs have a strong moral
claim on receiving more resources.
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All data provided by Pyne et al, ““How Bad Is Depression? Preference Score Estimates
From Depressed Patients and the General Population.”(2005). Data was collected and
consolidated from their study.
Table 1.1: all VAS and TTO data from Pyne et al. 2005.

Respondent Groups
Nonpatients

Patients (have experienced or are
experiencing depression)

Prev.
experienced,
General
not currently
Population experiencing

Determiner of
Degree of
MildModDepression in
Moderate Severe Respondents

Preference
elicitation
question

Degree of
Depression
being rated

Standard
Gamble

Mild
Depression

0.78

0.83

0.78

0.7 PHQ-9

Standard
Gamble

Moderate
Depression

0.7

0.74

0.68

0.63 PHQ-9

Standard
Gamble

Severe
Depression

0.54

0.59

0.54

0.51 PHQ-9

Standard
Gamble

Mild
Depression

0.87

0.89

0.87

0.79 SF-12

Standard
Gamble

Moderate
Depression

0.77

0.8

0.74

0.69 SF-12

Standard
Gamble

Severe
Depression

0.63

0.68

0.63

0.58 SF-12

VAS/Rating
Scale

Mild
Depression

74.7

75.4

70.8

67.2 PHQ-9

VAS/Rating
Scale

Moderate
Depression

62.6

58.6

53.6

49.5 PHQ-9

VAS/Rating
Scale

Severe
Depression

43.5

35.8

33.5

30.7 PHQ-9

VAS/Rating
Scale

Mild
Depression

89.5

86.1

88.1

83.6 SF-12

VAS/Rating
Scale

Moderate
Depression

72.2

69.2

67.1

62.7 SF-12

VAS/Rating
Scale

Severe
Depression

50.7

50.4

45.9

42.3 SF-12
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Graph 1.1: Respondent valuations of mild depression via standard gamble
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Graph 1.2: Respondent valuations of mild depression via visual analogue scale
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Graph 1.3: Respondent valuations of moderate depression via standard gamble
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Graph 1.4: Respondent valuations of moderate depression via visual analogue scale
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Graph 1.5: Respondent valuations of severe depression via standard gamble
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Graph 1.6: Respondent valuations of severe depression via visual analogue scale

Differences	
  in	
  Quality	
  Weights	
  of	
  Severe	
  
Depression	
  Assigned	
  by	
  Patient	
  and	
  Non-Patient	
  
Groups	
  Using	
  Visual	
  Analogue	
  Scale	
  
50.7	
  

50.4	
  

45.9	
  

42.3	
  

43.5	
  
35.8	
  

33.5	
  

30.7	
  
VAS/Rating	
  Scale	
  
Mod-‐Severe	
  

Mild-‐Moderate	
  

Prev.	
  experienced,	
  not	
  
currently	
  
experiencing	
  

VAS/Rating	
  Scale	
  
General	
  Population	
  

60	
  
50	
  
40	
  
30	
  
20	
  
10	
  
0	
  

Linear(VAS/Rating	
  Scale)	
  
Linear(VAS/Rating	
  Scale)	
  

